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A recent case which involves the question of a contract in re-
straint of trade is that of Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 41
N. E., 1048 (Ind.), in which the authorities upon this subject are
collected. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction against the
defendant to prevent him from pursuing his business of selling
oil and gasoline upon the ground of a contract between the par-
ties. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint the
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana. The con-
tract was in substance as follows: That the defendant entered into
a written agreement with one Benham, who is described as trus-
tee and manager, by which in consideration of three hundred dol-
lars to him in hand paid, he sold, etc., to Benham or his assigns
all his rights in his oil and gasoline business, together with good
will and personal property connected therewith, and further con-
tracted and agreed that he (the defendant) would not during the
next five years ensuing engage in the business of selling or deliv-
ering gasoline in any way within the State of Indiana, the City
of Indianapolis excepted. Benham assigned his rights to the
plaintiff who brought this action upon the defendant's violation
of his contract. Jordan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
* * * "It is settled that a contract in general restraint of
trade is invalid, but one restraining a party from trading within
reasonable limits, so as not to be injurious to the interests of
the public, is valid, and may be enforced by an injunction upon
a proper showing of facts. Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind., 200; Duffy
v. Shockey, ii Ind., 70; Spicer v. Hoop, 51 Ind., 365; Baker v.
Pottmeyer, 75 Ind., 451; Beatty v. Coble (at this term), 41 N. E.,
390. The settled rule, as enunciated by the American and Eng-
lish decisions of the highest courts, seems to be that where in the
particular case before the court, the restraint in controversy, as
to territory, appears to be broader or larger than is necessary to
the protection of the party seeking to enforce the restrictive con-
tract, it is of no benefit to either party, but in that event becomes
oppressive upon the party against whom the enforcement is
sought, and, being oppressive, the law regards the restriction as
unreasonable and injurious to the interests of the public.
* * * "The law regards the good will of a particular trade or
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business as a species of property, possessing a market value, and
subject to sale or disposal. But it is also a well-established
principle of law and public policy that, where a person is en-
gaged in trading or other legitimate pursuits, he shall not be
unreasonably fettered in the exercise of such business, and, when
he sells or disposes of the good will incident thereto, the law will
only sustain such a restraint as to his future engagement in such
business or pursuit as will appear to be a reasonable space of
interdicted territory, and what are such reasonable limits is a
question of law for the court to determine, under all the facts
and circumstances in each particular case. In support of the
several general propositions herein asserted, see Wiley v. Baum-
garden, 97 Ind., 66, and authorities there cited; Lawrence v.
Kidder, io Barb., 641; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. i5; Homer
v. Graves, 7 Bing., 735; Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 2o Wall., 64;
Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 370; Dunlop v. Gregory, xo N. Y.,
241; Greenh. Pub. Pol. c. 6, p. 683; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law,
883, and authorities there cited; 22 Am. Law R-ev., 873-889;
Mallan v. M7fay, ii Mees. & W., 652. In the case of Dunlop v.
Gregory, supra, the court of appeals of New York said: "Con-
tracts, upon whatever consideration made, which go to the total
restraint of trade anywhere in the State, are void. Such con-
tracts are injurious to the public, and operate oppressively upon
one party, without being beneficial to the other. * * * The
contract, to be upheld, must appear from special circumstances
to be reasonable and useful, and the restraint of the covenanter
must not be larger than is necessary for the protection of the
covenantee in the enjoyment of his trade or business." In the
case of Taylor v. Blanchard, supra, it was held that an agree-
ment not to set up, exercise, or carry on the trade or business of
manufacturing or selling shoe cutters at any place within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was void. In the case of More
v. Bonnet, 40 Cal., 25x, a stipulation not to engage in a business
of a particular kind in the county or city of San Francisco or
State of California was held to be void. In Lawrence v. Kidder,
supra, a covenant not to conduct the business of manufacturing
or trading in palm leaf beds or mattresses in the State of New
York west of Albany was held to be invalid. In Price v. Green,
16 Mees. & W., 346, a contract not to carry on the perfume busi-
ness within six hundred miles of London was adjudged void.
In Horner v. Graves, supra, an agreement not to practice den-
tistry within a district two hundred miles in diameter was held to be
void. In Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich., 490, where it appeared that the
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obligor sold a printing establishment, and the business thereof,
which extended over the entire State, a covenant not to engage
in the same business in that State so long as the vendee should
continue in the business at the place of sale, under the circum-
stances, was held to be reasonable and valid. In Rousillon v.
Rousillon, reported in 14 Ch. Div., 351, the English Court of Chan-
cery held that there is no "hard and fast" rule holding contracts
of this character, unlimited as to space, void, but that the validity
depends upon the reasonableness of the contract; and, where it
appears that the broad restriction is reasonably necessary for the
full protection of the contractee, it will be sustained. In a
recent English decision in the appeal of Nordenfelt v. Maxim,
Nordenfelt, etc. Co. [1894] App. Cas., 535, where a patentee and
manufacturer of guns and ammunition for war purposes trans-
ferred his patent to a company, and covenbnted with the latter
not to engage in that business for a term of twenty-five years, it
was held that, owing to the nature of the business, and the lim-
ited number of customers to whom sales might be made, confined
mainly to governments of countries, the restraint imposed in that
case was not larger than was necessary for the protection of the
contractee, and not injuirous to the public interest."
Viewed in the light of these authorities the contract was
decided to be in restraint of trade because if the plaintiff could buy
out the defendant and thus restrain him he could proceed to buy out
and restrain every other person in the State engaged in a similar
business and eventually reduce the sale of oils to comparatively
few and thus stifle legitimate competition. Public policy favors
competition and is opposed to monopolies which tend to advance
prices to the injury of the public in general (Salt Co. v. Guthrie,
35 Ohio St., 666; People v. Chieago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill., 268).
This contract is not devisable so as to allow defendant to be en-
joined as regards the City of Hammond in which he reengaged in
business (Beard v. Dennis, supra; Wiley v. Baumgarden, supra),
and so the restraint of trade under the circumstances being man-
ifestly too large, the contract is in revolution of public policy and
cannot be enforced.
The litigation over the famous Hocking Valley deal has
come to an end with the final decision of the New York Court
of Appeals on November 26th, 1895, in the case of BdIden v.
Burke et aL. (42 Northeastern Rep., 261). As the outcome of
the whole matter Burke and his associates emerge unscathed,
and the proceeds of this highly lucrative transaction remain in
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the hands of the shrewd operators who worked the road in i881.
The facts which form the basis of this suit are rather ancient
history, and it is sufficient to recall simply their outline. In i88i
the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Toledo Railroad was cre-
ated by consolidation of three smaller companies. The stock of
the new road was owned entirely by Burke and four associates.
In reorganizing the finances of the system a blanket mortgage
was issued of $14,500,OO, of which $6,500,000 was used to retire
the old bonds of the three component roads, while the remaining
$8,ooo, ooo of bonds were put in the hands of Burke to be placed
on the market. It is in regard to these latter bonds alone that
the present controversy arose, and it is based on the covenant
contained in these bonds that their proceeds should be applied to
building the road, double tracking, and purchase of new equip-
ment. Actually, however, these bonds were sold through Wins-
low, Lanier & Co., who were in the deal, and Burke took the
proceeds and bought up the whole stock of the Hocking Valley
Coal Company. The par value of this block of stock was only
$1,500,ooo, and at the time it sold at considerably less than par,
but this was all that the railroad company ever obtained in ex-
change for its $8,ooo,ooo worth of bonds, and the balance
remained unaccounted for in the hands of the five directors.
Belden brought this action as holder of certain of these bonds
which he had bought in open market, to enforce the covenant
which is above described, because the Central Trust Company,
trustee under the mortgage, refused to bring suit. Judge
O'Brien has written a very clear and interesting opinion which
sweeps away a great deal of the complication in which the case
was enveloped. Of course, as Burke et al. were the sole owners
of the company's stock in i88i, a bond holder in Belden's posi-
tion would be obliged to show that he had been deceived to his
actual injury to entitle him to equitable relief. The findings,
however, showed that he had suffered no injury for the bonds
had proved a paying investment, and beside this that he was not
deceived; he was not a purchaser without notice, but had bought
after full investigation and with knowledge of the whole transac-
tion, and therefore must, in equity, be deemed to have acted
upon and acquiesced in the condition of the security as he found
it. This knowledge by the plaintiff, the lapse of time, and long
acquiescense, combined with the absence of any actual loss, are
the grounds for the refusal of the court to review the transac-
tions between prior owners of such bonds and the railway which
had the assent of every party in interest. On this ground the
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court refused relief to Belden, thus reaching the same result as
the decision of the general term below, but upon a wholly differ-
ent ground. It is important to note that the court below ruled
that Belden's rights were derived solely from Winslow, Lanier &
Co., who of course had no right to object because they were
parties to the original deal. Judge O'Brien, however, takes
pains to say that this is incorrect in principle, and that the rights
of a bondholder are not affected by the mere fact that he traces
title back to parties who took part in the original transaction.
"Subsequent purchasers in good faith and without notice," the
court concludes, "are not precluded from relief on the ground
tlat Winslow, Lanier & Co. took the bonds with notice of the
actual transaction."
